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For forty-five years the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union has
defined the theory and practice of international security. We lived, it was assumed, in a
'bipolar world', with one pole in Washington and the other in Moscow. These poles oriented
our thinking about security, not only between the superpowers or even in Europe, but in
the world. Once the confrontation ended and the Cold War was declared over, the
custodians of international security policy scrambled to make sense of a world that had lost
its bearings. Their theoretical and practical compasses no longer gave direction.
In response to this loss, policy makers and students of international politics have been
engaged in rethinking international security. Much of this rethinking has involved identifying
interests—usually American interests—and arguing about how policy should be changed
to meet those interests now that the Cold War has concluded. More thoughtful
contributions to this debate have argued that the end of the Cold War provides the space
for an international security agenda that is not dominated by the supposed interests of the
United States and its allies, and is not concerned solely with the leading states' military
muscle. However, this very process of rethinking international security is also reshaping the
security agenda. It is developing new terms in which security is being thought, and is thereby
structuring the problems to be tackled and the solutions which will be tried.
The Cold War security environment was thought in terms of an image of bipolarity and of
Cold War. This defined and ordered problems—indeed, much of the 'new thinking' in
international security is a reaction against the exclusion and marginalisation of other
concerns. In large part the tasks of definition and ordering are performed by the
metaphorical content of the security images. Images comprise a series of metaphors, which
shape our understanding of policy problems, and thereby inform the solutions which are,
and are not, attempted. In this chapter I consider one of the central images which is
emerging from the rethinking of international security, the image of proliferation. I will
show how this image is being constructed in the discourse and practice of (particularly
western) states. I will also examine the metaphors which are contained in the image, and
show how they are informing a particular, and flawed, policy response.
One noted, and useful, example of the rethinking of international security was provided by
Charles Krauthammer, in the journal of record of the US foreign policy elite, Foreign Affairs,
in early 1991. He was responding directly to the collapse of the 'bipolar' image of the Cold
War: "Ever since it became clear that an exhausted Soviet Union was calling off the Cold
War, the quest has been on for a new American role in the world. Roles, however, are not
invented in the abstract; they are a response to a perceived world structure."1 The structure
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Krauthammer perceived following bipolarity was a "Unipolar Moment". In addition to
redefining international security in terms of unipolarity, Krauthammer also gave an early
statement of the 'proliferation' problem as it would come to be understood:
The post-Cold War era is thus perhaps better called the era of weapons of mass
destruction. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our
lives. That is what makes a new international order not an imperial dream or a
Wilsonian fantasy but a matter of the sheerest prudence. It is slowly dawning on the
West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and
those who brandish them.2
Krauthammer's article appeared as a US-led coalition was using Iraq as a test range for its
vast assortment of weapons of all kinds of destruction. The aftermath of this war in the
Gulf saw 'the West' pick up the pace of their realisation that longer term action was needed
to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the massive
conventional army which Iraq deployed (admittedly to little effect) was seen to tie
conventional weapons to this new security agenda. 'Proliferation' thus came to be seen as
a wide ranging problem, encompassing not only the spread of nuclear weapons, but of
chemical and biological weapons, as well as the diffusion of conventional arms.
Not only did Krauthammer sound the warning on proliferation, he also set out the elements
of a response to this new threat:
[A]ny solution will have to include three elements: denying, disarming, and
defending. First, we will have to develop a new regime, similar to COCOM
(Coordinating Committee on Export Controls) to deny yet more high technology to
such states. Second, those states that acquire such weapons anyway will have to
submit to strict outside control or risk being physically disarmed. A final element
must be the development of antiballistic missile and air defense systems to defend
against those weapons that do escape Western control or preemption.3
The three elements of Krauthammer's response correspond well with the policy
developments in the subsequent four years:
1. The first line of attack is a regime based on technology denial. Indeed, the COCOM
formally concluded its work in March 1994, and its members are engaged in
establishing a non-proliferation export control regime which would include also the
states of central and eastern Europe. More generally, regimes of technology denial
are the foundation of the non-proliferation effort. Consider the communiqué of the
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4. The Communiqué cites the regimes as the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC. The NPT is the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It entered into force in 1970, and recognises five nuclear weapons
states, forbidding all other states to acquire nuclear weapons and to help others in their acquisition.
The CWC is the Chemical Weapons Convention. It was signed in January 1993, and is expected to
enter into force in 1995. It bans chemical weapons and their production, and unlike the NPT is
universal and non-discriminatory. There are no 'chemical weapons states'. The BTWC is the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It entered into force in 1975, and bans the production
and holding of biological weapons of all kinds. Unlike the other two, there are no verification
measures associated with the convention, although the States Party are considering
adding a verification protocol.
The regimes to which the NAC refers in §4 are each limited membership supplier regimes. They
jointly agree to lists of technologies on which export controls are to be maintained, although the
controls themselves are applied nationally by the members. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
and the Zangger Committee both control nuclear technology and material. The Australia Group
applies controls to technologies related to chemical and biological weapons. The Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) applies controls to ballistic and cruise missile technology, with a range
greater than 300km and a payload greater than 500kg.
5. "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", Issued at the
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Istanbul, Turkey on 9 June 1994, M-NAC-
1(94)45, 2.
North Atlantic Council, announcing an Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction", 9 June 1994:
3. Current international efforts focus on the prevention of WMD and missile
proliferation through a range of international treaties and regimes.4 .... 
4. The aforementioned treaties are complemented on the supply side by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group and
the Missile Technology Control Regime. These regimes should be reinforced
through the broadest possible adherence to them and enhancement of their
effectiveness.5
Once the successor to COCOM is in place—assuming it maintains a version of
COCOM's munitions and dual-use technologies lists—there will be in place
technology denial regimes for the three weapons of mass destruction (nuclear,
chemical and biological), missile delivery systems and conventional arms. With the
exception of missile systems, there will also be some form of international
mechanism addressing each of these as well, as the United Nations has created a
Register of Conventional Arms.
2. Krauthammer's second suggestion was for tight international supervision or the
threat of forcible disarmament. On 9 April 1991 the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 687 which outlined the forcible disarmament of Iraq. It mandated a
Special Commission (UNSCOM) which, together with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), would oversee the declaration and destruction of the Iraqi
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons holdings and production capabilities, as
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well as their missile technology.6 Similarly, through May and June of 1994, North
Korea was threatened with international sanction, and possible military conflict with
the South and the United States, should they not allow international inspection of
their nuclear facilities.
3. The final element of a security policy to counter proliferation, which Krauthammer
outlined, was the development of military capabilities to defend against what has
come to be called 'the post-proliferation environment'. The recent US threats of
violence in the case of North Korea are one example of such a military response
forming part of the reaction to the problem of 'proliferation'. A second is found in
the NATO declaration, quoted above:
12. Recent events in Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated that WMD
proliferation can occur despite international non-proliferation norms and
agreements. As a defensive Alliance, NATO must therefore address the
military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use, and if
necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations and forces.
13. NATO will therefore:
. . . .
- seek, if necessary, to improve defence capabilities of NATO and its
members to protect NATO territory, populations and forces against
WMD use, based on assessments of threats (including non-State actors),
Allied military doctrine and planning, and Allied military capabilities.7
It would seem, then, that it has dawned on the West that proliferation is a serious security
problem—indeed, in January 1992, an unprecedented Summit meeting of the UN Security
Council declared proliferation a threat to international peace and security. Such a
determination opens the way for multilateral military action to respond to proliferation,
under the terms of the United Nations' Charter.
'Proliferation' appears to have been developed as a central image in the new international
security agenda in the time between Krauthammer's article and the recent NATO summit.
The spur to the construction of this image was the war in the Gulf. In the first section of
this paper, I trace the construction of the image of proliferation in the pronouncements and
practices of the Western states following the Gulf War. This image of proliferation as a
security problem is, as Krauthammer noted, a perception of the state of the world. That
perception is a metaphorical one, as the image of a security problem which is created is
grounded in metaphor. In the second section I discuss the nature of image and metaphor
as they relate to the constitution of international security. Finally, I examine the particular
5Reimagining Security    
8. George Bush, "The World After the Persian Gulf War", Address before a joint session of
Congress, 6 March 1991. US Department of State Dispatch, 2 (10) 1991, 162.
9. Bush, "The World After the Persian Gulf War", 162.
metaphors of the proliferation image, in order to show how they shape the understanding
of a problem, and the policy solutions which are developed in response.
Reimagining International Security
In November 1990 the central combatants had gathered in Paris to mark formally the end
of the Cold War, and to herald an era of peace. By the end of the February following, the
Gulf War had convinced the leading policy-makers of the need to rethink international order
and international security a little more clearly than just hoping for peace. The Gulf War had
seemed to promise a United Nations which could function as an organ of international
collective security—providing all ignored the driving role of the United States in
shepherding UN actions in the Gulf. Thus, in his address to Congress following the
conclusion of the Gulf War, George Bush called for a UN-centred 'new world order':
Until now, the world we've known had been a world divided—a world of barbed
wire and concrete block, conflict and Cold War. Now, we can see a new world
coming into view, a world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world
order: in the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which "the principles of
justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong ...."; a world where the United
Nations—freed from Cold War stalemate—is poised to fulfil the historic vision of
its founders; a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home
among nations.8
Bush's new world order was to be one of liberal democracy and human rights within a
functioning United Nations, but "The victory over Iraq was not waged as a 'war to end all
wars.' Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring
peace must be our mission."9 What posed the threat to enduring peace in this new world
order? On 8 February, while the fighting was still ongoing, the Canadian government made
a proposal which provided one answer, an answer echoing the alarm sounded by
Krauthammer in Foreign Affairs:
Canada has long been a leading proponent of measures to deal effectively with the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has advocated restraint and
effective controls on the export of conventional weapons.
The current Gulf crisis, with its use of missile technology and threatened use of
chemical and biological weapons, highlights these concerns; we must seize the
opportunity to address them positively and effectively.
Canada proposes a gathering of world leaders under United Nations auspices to issue
a statement of global, political will, condemning the proliferation of weapons of mass
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10. External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Post-Hostilities Activities", Backgrounder, 8
February 1991. The proposal was announced in two speeches that day, one by Prime Minister
Mulroney and one by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark.
11. At its 1988 session, the UNGA had struck a 'Group of Experts on the Study of Ways and Means
of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms'. (UNGA Resolution
43/74, December 7, 1988). In its 1990 report to the UNGA, the Group of Experts held that a
register of conventional arms transfers was impossible for the foreseeable future.
destruction and their delivery systems, as well as massive build-ups of conventional
weapons; and, endorsing a comprehensive programme of action to address these
concerns.
Under this programme of action, individual proliferation concerns will be addressed
in those multilateral forums set up to deal with them.
Individual programmes of action on proliferation issues will be carried out so that
by 1995, a subsequent conference might celebrate completion of the comprehensive
network of specific non-proliferation regimes.10
In this proposal, Canada gathered together all of the technological elements which would
come to compose the new 'Proliferation' agenda: weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)—which are chemical, biological and nuclear weapons—their delivery
systems—particularly missile technology—and massive build-ups of conventional weapons.
For the first time, proliferation would now refer to the full range of weapons and related
technologies, not just to nuclear weapons, or even weapons of mass destruction. The
proposal for a world summit was not well received, but the rest of the policy agenda Canada
outlined was picked up by others. Over the course of the next three years, in various fora,
the foreign affairs and international security community of the leading states reiterated the
problem, gradually refining the terms of the image it provided. 
An important feature of the Canadian proposal was the inclusion of conventional weapons
in a non-proliferation agenda. Canada had called for the creation of a Register of
Conventional Arms at the United Nations, a proposal that had been made previously, but
met with little success.11 With the example of the Iraqi arsenal, the idea of at least tracking
conventional weapons transfers gained credence. In April, at a meeting of the European
Council, Prime Minister John Major announced that the United Kingdom would take the
lead on creating the Arms Register, and won the backing of his European partners. Even
France agreed, in a broad package of non-proliferation measures it released 31 May—a
package which included France's accession to the NPT. Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu also
announced Japanese support for the Register in April, and further declared that Japan would
join the UK to sponsor a resolution creating such a Register at the UN General Assembly
that fall.
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12. "Bush Proposes Arms Control Initiative for Middle East", Text of a speech by President George
Bush to the Air Force Academy, 29 May 1991, EUR304, 3.
13. "Fact Sheet: Middle East Arms Control Initiative", Department of State Dispatch, 3 June 1991.
14. This right is even recalled in the UN Resolution creating the Arms Register, as the third
substantive paragraph of Resolution 46/36L reads: "Reaffirms the inherent right to individual or
collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which implies
that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves."
The inclusion of conventional arms in the proliferation agenda had been spurred, quite
clearly, by the large Iraqi conventional arsenal. In his 6 March address to Congress,
President Bush had promised an initiative to address the problem of conventional arms
building in the Middle East. He delivered on this promise in a speech to the US Air Force
Academy 29 May:
Nowhere are the dangers of weapons proliferation more urgent than in the Middle
East.
After consulting with governments in the region and elsewhere about how
to slow and then reverse the buildup of unnecessary and destabilizing weapons, I am
today proposing a Middle East arms control initiative. It features supplier guidelines
on conventional arms exports; barriers to exports that contribute to weapons of mass
destruction; a freeze now, and later a ban on surface-to-surface missiles in the region;
and a ban on production of nuclear weapons material. Halting the proliferation of
conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East, while supporting the
legitimate needs of every state to defend itself, will require the cooperation of many
states, in the region and around the world.12
In the accompanying fact sheet released by the White House, the connection between
Bush's proposal and the more general problems of proliferation, addressed particularly in
the prior actions by the UK and Canada, was drawn explicitly: "Since proliferation is a global
problem, it must find a global solution. At the same time, the current situation in the Middle
East poses unique dangers and opportunities. Thus, the president's proposal will concentrate
on the Middle East as its starting point, while complementing other initiatives such as those
taken by Prime Ministers John Major and [Canada's] Brian Mulroney."13
There are two important aspects of the language Bush adopted to address the problem in
his speech to the Air Force Academy. The first is that Bush uses the term 'proliferation' to
refer to all forms of weapons: "the proliferation of conventional and unconventional
weapons". During the Cold War, 'proliferation' was used exclusively to discuss weapons of
mass destruction, and primarily to refer to the spread of nuclear weapons. A key feature of
the way in which proliferation is being constructed as a post-Cold War security problem is
the broad technological sweep of the concept. The move to join conventional weapons to
unconventional in a proliferation control agenda poses a particular problem, however. As
Bush notes, states are considered to have a right to arms in support of the "legitimate needs
of every state to defend itself."14 If conventional arms are to be controlled along side WMD,
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15. "Statement of the Five Countries", Paris, 9 July 1991, reprinted in Richard Dean Burns, ed.,
Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III, (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 1481-83.
16. The one rather interesting change from the Canadian proposal is the limitation of 'delivery
systems' to 'missiles'. While Canada highlighted the problem of missiles, their text seems to leave
open the possibility of including other forms of delivery system. The 'missile' focus has been
maintained, however, leading to critique of the proliferation control agenda from those who feel that
attack aircraft are at least as problematic as missiles for their capacity to deliver WMD. See John
Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military
Effectiveness", International Security, 17 (2) 1992, 41-83.
a means to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate needs to be devised. This is the
second important aspect of Bush's language. The President equates problematic arms
building—what was termed in the Canadian proposal "massive build-ups"—with
"destabilizing" accumulations. In other words, while states have a right to conventional
arms, they do not have a right to acquire conventional arms in such a way that they are
destabilising. Thus, in this address, Bush provides the two metaphorical pillars of the new
security image: proliferation and stability. Since this speech, the discourse and practice of
states has refined this image and drawn it to the centre of international security policy in the
post-Cold War world.
In July of 1991, this broad proliferation agenda was advanced beyond the Middle East by
the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Five met to "review issues related
to conventional arms transfers and to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction". They
noted with concern the dangers associated with the excessive buildup of military
capabilities, and confirmed they would not transfer conventional weapons in
circumstances which would undermine stability. They also noted the threats to peace
and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological
weapons, and missiles, and undertook to seek effective measures of non-proliferation
and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a
global as well as a regional basis.15
The statement of the Five echoed closely Bush's May speech, accepting as problematic the
full range of military technology,16 while broadening the geographic concern. The statement
also followed Bush's lead in focussing on 'stability' as the marker of problematic transfers.
This definition of the proliferation problem—encompassing the full range of military
technologies, and concerned with preventing the 'destabilising' effects of conventional arms
procurement—was echoed in the resolution the Japanese and British introduced at the fall
session of the UNGA. By Resolution 46/36L of 9 December 1991 the UNGA created "a
universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on
international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military
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19. "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation", issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, Press
Communiqué S-1 (91) 86, 8.
holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies...."17 The first
preambular paragraph of that Resolution reads in part: "Realizing that excessive and
destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international security
...."18 This text reaffirms the image put forward by the P-5 of 'excessive' and 'destabilising'
arms build-ups as problematic. It also links this image directly to 'international security'.
Finally, despite the fact that Resolution 46/36L is designed to address the problem of
conventional arms, the relationship to weapons of mass destruction is not forgotten. In the
final preambular paragraph, the Resolution reads: "Recognizing also the importance of the
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction."
The problem of proliferation was also being addressed by the leading Western military
organisation, the North Atlantic Alliance, while the UNGA deliberations were ongoing. At
its Summit in Rome, in November 1991, the North Atlantic Council released a Declaration,
which addressed the problems of proliferation directly:
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of
delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional armaments
beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement
of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a
universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support
steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives
designed to build confidence and underpin international security.19
The "Rome Declaration" clearly joins the full range of military technology together as
"aspects of proliferation", and indicates that proliferation is a threat to international security.
At the same Summit, the Council adopted a new Strategic Concept, a revision of the basic
document of NATO strategy. The Strategic Concept notes that the Alliance has an interest
in Middle Eastern stability, a stability which can be threatened by the "build-up of military
power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles." More generally, the Strategic Concept outlines the new
strategic environment facing the Alliance after the end of the Cold War:
Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction,
would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance
security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can
be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of
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20. Both quotations are from "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", agreed by the Heads of State
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8
November 1991, Press Communiqué S-1 85, 4.
21. "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation",
20 December 1991, Press Communiqué M-NACC-1 (91) (Rev), 1.
22. "NACC Statement", 20 December 1991, 2.
mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism
and sabotage.20
While the Gulf War provided an important impetus for this growing concern with
proliferation, so too did the condition of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the
then Soviet Union. All these states were possessed of large arsenals, some also with a
military productive capacity. In addition, the USSR had a large supply of nuclear weapons,
material and expertise, and in late 1991 it was unclear how long these could be kept under
central control. On 20 December, the members of NATO met for the first time with the
members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation, in a "process of regular diplomatic
liaison ... to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe", termed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).21
In its inaugural declaration, the NACC tackled the problem of proliferation, particularly
nuclear proliferation arising from its members' holdings, and in doing so reinforced the
emergent image of proliferation and stability: "We all recognise the need ... to refrain from
any steps that could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction and to take firm measures to prevent the unauthorised export of nuclear or
other destabilizing military technologies."22
By the end of 1991, the image of proliferation as an important security problem confronting
states as they build the new world order had been enunciated by a variety of actors in a
range of fora. Subsequently, the importance of this problem as it had come to be defined
grew, and various practical measures were marshalled to address it. In July 1992, the G-7
included a discussion of proliferation in their Political Declaration: "The end of the East-
West confrontation provides a historic opportunity, but also underlines the urgent need to
curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and missiles
capable of delivering them." The G-7 also pointed to the particular practical measures which
were needed to confront this problem. The first was strengthening and extending the NPT
at the review and extension conference in 1995. The nuclear non-proliferation regime also
needed to be bolstered by making a concerted effort to contain the nuclear technology of
the former Soviet Union and by strengthening the IAEA, whose limits had been revealed
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by Iraq. The G-7 also recognised the need to strengthen control on missile proliferation,
specifically the MTCR, and to control conventional weapons proliferation.23
The G-7 statement hinted at the first line of response to proliferation: gathering instruments
aimed at controlling the various technologies now considered to be a proliferation concern
under the rubric of non-proliferation. The United States furthered this approach the week
after the G-7 Summit, announcing a 'Non-Proliferation Initiative'. In practical terms, the
initiative refocussed extant practice on 'proliferation'. In Arms Control Today, Spurgeon
Keeney notes this feature of the initiative with dismay:
President Bush's long-awaited 'nonproliferation initiative', which commits the
United States to take a leading role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, is
remarkable for the absence of initiatives. The statement, basically a list of past
accomplishments and ongoing activities, was aptly described by a senior government
official as the conversion of 'practice into policy.' Unfortunately, the president has
sacrificed a major opportunity for launching imaginative new proposals to
entrenched bureaucratic interests mired in Cold War thinking.24
While Keeney laments the lack of initiative, the refocussing of policy instruments is exactly
what we should expect from an exercise in reimagining. The understanding of the security
environment is being altered, and so what used to be 'nuclear non-proliferation' instruments,
and 'arms control' instruments and even 'export control' instruments, are now all seen as
aspects of the controls for a single problem: proliferation.
The refocussing of various arms control instruments onto the problem now being
understood as proliferation proceeded in parallel with the development of discursive policy
I sketched above. In relation to the 'core' of the proliferation problem, nuclear weapons,
attention began to be focussed on the conference of States Party to the NPT, to be held in
1995. The NPT had a duration of 25 years, after which the States Party were to determine
whether it "shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for a fixed period or
periods".25 The importance of the NPT extension conference is that without the NPT states
would find it difficult to construct a broad non-proliferation regime. The looming 1995
deadline has allowed for the possible development of two new control measures: a
Comprehensive Test Ban (CTBT) and a Cutoff on the Production of Fissile Materials. Both
of these measures have a long history, but a history without a record of any substantial
success. In the summer of 1993, however, the United States altered its long-standing
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26. The CD is the leading multilateral forum for arms control and disarmament negotiations. It
meets in three sessions a year, at the United Nations buildings in Geneva. It is not formally part of
the UN, although the UN Secretariat provides secretarial support, and the CD does report to the
Secretary General. The CD is the successor to the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference, the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference and the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament.
The CD most recently produced the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993). It is not to be mistaken
for the Disarmament Commission (UNDC), which is a UN body.
27. In the only article between 1985 and 1990 to address the question of a CTBT in Foreign Affairs, Paul
Doty indicates the context within which the CTBT was considered at the time: The article makes
no mention of proliferation, rather "At issue is whether the single, radical step of ending all nuclear
weapons testing ... is the best route to stopping the qualitative arms race?" See Paul Doty, "A
Nuclear Test Ban", Foreign Affairs, 65 (4) 1987, 750-69.
opposition to a CTBT, and also called for a Cutoff Convention. Both are now being
discussed by the Conference on Disarmament (CD).26
The change in the American position is indicative of the process of reimagination I am
discussing. During the Cold War, the CTBT was seen as a means to curtail the nuclear arms
race between the US and the Soviet Union. The American opposition was justified by an
argument that testing was needed to ensure the safety of the US arsenal. However, it was
more truly based on a fear that the Soviet Union could evade any feasible verification
system.27 With the passage of the Cold War, and of the centrality of the US-Soviet nuclear
balance, the verification question ceased to be whether the USSR could evade the detection
procedures, but whether those procedures could catch a first time tester. Seen in a
'proliferation' context, a CTBT with feasible though not perfect verification was seen to be
in the US interest, in a way that it was not in the Cold War context.
Chemical weapons had received a particularly high profile during the Gulf War, as there
were fears that Iraq would attack the coalition forces—or even Israeli civilians—with
chemical arms. This spurred the completion, in December 1992, of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, banning the production and holding of all chemical arms and controlling the
precursor chemicals needed to create them. The Iraqi use of Scud missiles also focussed
attention on the problems posed by the proliferation of missile technology—a concern
reflected in many of the statements quoted above. Controls have been organised through
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), created by the G-7 countries in 1987. In
November of 1991, meeting in Washington, the MTCR states agreed to expand the scope
of the restrictions so that missiles capable of delivering any form of mass destruction
weapon would be covered. In addition, to serve as a fully fledged non-proliferation regime,
the MTCR would need to expand its membership. In 1990, the Regime was opened to states
other than the G-7, and by March of 1993, with the admission of Iceland, the membership
stood at 23. At that meeting, the MTCR partners also discussed how "the Regime might
evolve from being a pure export control regime to a broader, more formal multilateral non-
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29. The journals surveyed were: International Security, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Orbis, and The Washington Quarterly.
The issues included those from 1985 to those published by the end of June 1994.
30. The Policy Framework on Non-Proliferation adopted by the NATO in June 1994 recognises
this layered approach as the foundation of global efforts to address proliferation:
3. Current international efforts focus on the prevention of WMD and missile proliferation through a
range of international treaties and regimes. The most important norm-setting treaties are the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC)....
4. The aforementioned treaties are complemented on the supply side by the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
proliferation arrangement that develops and promotes international norms in the transfer
and control of missile technology."28
There has thus emerged a new image at the heart of international security. It is an image of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and of destabilising
accumulations of conventional weapons. I have detailed how this image was constructed in
the discourse of the leading actors and institutions of the international system. The
importance of this new image is reflected in the academic literature on foreign and security
problems. I conducted a review of the issues between 1985 and the present in five of the
leading US foreign policy journals, journals which reflect and inform the policy debate
within the United States. This review bears out the contention advanced here that
'proliferation' is a problem enunciated to fill the gap left by the Cold War, and catalysed by
the experience in the Gulf. There were only 7 articles on the problem between 1985 and the
fall of the Berlin Wall—of which five were concerned with nuclear proliferation. There were
9 articles in the year between 1989 and the Gulf War. Since the end of the Gulf War, there
have been 56 articles in these journals concerned with proliferation.29
In addition to the new image, there is also a clear pattern to the strategy being employed in
response. It is a three-tiered strategy, anchored at the global level by "formal multilateral
non-proliferation arrangement[s]". At present there are four such arrangements: the NPT,
the CWC, the BTWC and the UN Arms Register. This leaves only missile technology, of
the identified concerns, without a global arrangement, and hence the proposal for the
evolution of the MTCR. The second tier of the control strategy is a collection of supplier
control regimes. The MTCR is joined by the Australia Group which controls Chemical and
Biological technology, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee which
control nuclear technology, and the successor regime to the COCOM which is to control
conventional and dual-use technology. Finally, these supplier controls are implemented
nationally by export control systems.30
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This strategy is designed to prevent proliferation, but as proliferation is a threat to
international security, there has also been thought given to a response to proliferation, once
it has occurred. In the United States, this has resulted in discussion of 'counter-proliferation',
which the former US Defense Secretary has defined as the use of the military to respond to
proliferation. In May and June of 1994 it seemed that the first example of 'counter-
proliferation' would be seen in North Korea—and at the time of writing, while such a war
is no longer imminent, it is still very much a possibility. The United States has also enlisted
its NATO allies to the cause of counter-proliferation, understood in this fashion:
11. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to
prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through
diplomatic means....
. . . .
12. Recent events in Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated that WMD
proliferation can occur despite international non-proliferation norms and
agreements. As a defensive Alliance, NATO must therefore address the military
capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use, and if necessary, to
protect NATO territory, populations and forces.31
The international security environment is thus being reimagined. The image which guided
international security policy and scholarship during the Cold War has given way to a new
image centred on 'proliferation'. This image is informing both policy and academic debate,
and is found reflected in the instruments and institutions of international arms control and
security, as well as in the written record of the academy. What are the implications of this
image? How can we understand the way in which this image informs policy, reshaping
instruments, institutions and even interests? The images of security comprise a number of
metaphors, which shape our thinking about problems and solutions—in the present case,
the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability' and its related metaphor 'balance'. In order to
consider the role that image plays in international security, it is necessary to appreciate the
way in which metaphors constitute our understandings, and thereby inform the conception
we hold of a policy problem, and the solutions we develop to address those problems.
Images, Metaphors and Understandings
Scott Sagan has recently argued that the dominant approach to the proliferation problem
within the academic community has been rooted in rational deterrence theory, based on an
"assumption that states behave in a basically rational manner, pursuing their interests
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32. Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons", International Security, 18 (4) 1994, 71.
33. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation", 71-72.
34. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore
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according to expected-utility theory".32 There are a variety of problems with a theory based
on the maximisation of expected utility as a basis for a theory of political action. Sagan
proposed to use organisation theory as a corrective to some of these problems. This theory
introduces two limitations on rational choice: "large organizations function within a severely
'bounded' form of rationality", and "have multiple conflicting goals and the process by
which objectives are chosen and pursued is intensely political."33 In other words, Sagan
recognises that the interests on the basis of which actors choose are not pre-constituted as
rational deterrence theory supposes. Ned Lebow and Janice Stein broaden this critique
beyond the organisational:
Neither theories of deterrence nor rational choice say anything about the all-
important preferences that shape leaders' calculations. Achen and Snidal correctly
observe that deterrence theory assumes exogenously given preferences and choice
options. It begs the question of how preferences are formed. Empirical analyses of
decision making suggest that individuals often identify their preferences and options
in the course of formulating and reformulating a problem.34
The problem can be stated in general terms: rational choice theory assumes: a) a set of pre-
constituted utilities (or interests) and b) a pre-constituted problem. Lebow and Stein, along
with Sagan's organisational corrective, draw attention to the first, but only hint at the
second. The argument I am advancing is that the problem, interests and possible solutions
are shaped, at least in part, metaphorically. Lebow and Stein's 'formulation and
reformulation of a problem' involves adducing and refining an image. In the preceding
section I have detailed the emergence in state pronouncements and practices of an image
of the international security environment following the Cold War. In other words, a
problem is not presented to policy makers fully formed, but is rather constituted by actors
in their (discursive) practices. This practically constituted image of a security problem shapes
the interests states have at stake in that problem, and the forms of solution that can be
addressed to resolve it. Central to this function of shaping interests and responses is the
metaphorical character of the image so constituted. To understand how an image shapes
interest and policy is it first necessary to consider how metaphor shapes understanding.
Paul Chilton has provided a useful example of the role of metaphor in shaping
understandings in international relations, particularly concerning the Cold War discourses
around nuclear weapons and the relationship of 'the West' to 'the Soviet Union'. In doing
so, he illustrates how the metaphor naturalises a policy, and the apparent interests
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35. Paul Chilton, "Revealing Metaphors", in his, Orwellian Language and the Media, (London: Pluto, 1988),
58.
36. Throughout the remainder of this discussion it will be necessary to indicate words which denote
images and those which denote metaphors. Following roughly the usage of George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson, I will capitalise the name of images, while enclosing metaphors in single inverted commas.
The image with which I am concerned, then, is that of PROLIFERATION, which comprises three
key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance'.
37. Chilton uses two terms, 'scripts' and 'frames' to refer to the concept I have developed as image.
For consistency, throughout this paper, I use the single term 'image'.
underlying it—in this case, the central security policy of Cold War Europe. Chilton works
with the example of a fairly common speech from the Foreign Secretary of the United
Kingdom, John Nott. Nott used a metaphor of 'a dying giant' to argue that there is a
possibility of the Soviet Union attacking Western Europe in order to defend the 'peace
through strength' policy of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and her American
mentor Ronald Reagan. As Chilton notes, "What Nott wants to do, it seems, is to assert the
likelihood of Russia attacking Europe." On the basis of such an assertion, 'proven' through
the analogical reasoning of metaphor, the government can justify a policy of military
hostility, to insure against the lashing out of a dying giant.35
Chilton argues that policy makers address problems by means of what I have called
'images'36—that is, the student or policy maker constructs a metaphorical image of problem,
an issue or even other actors.37 This image relates the thing being imagined to another, in terms
of which the first is understood. These images comprise metaphors, which are used to
structure and support our understanding of a problem, and therefore our response to the
problem. In Chilton's example, the key relationship is the support the image and its
metaphors provide for pre-existing policy. His political concern is with the bellicose nuclear
strategy pursued by the Western Alliance, and the consequent danger of nuclear 'war' that
the governments foist on the people of Europe and North America through the metaphors
supporting the image of the Soviet Union. However, the general relationships between the
image of a policy problem, the condition of the problem itself and the policy solution to that
problem allow the ideas he develops to be given wider scope than Chilton provides. The
metaphors entailed by a given image do more than simply support a policy choice, they
structure the way in which the image holder can think about a problem, and so shape that
choice in the first place.
Chilton's use of metaphor is rooted in a prior argument, advanced by George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson. By considering their arguments directly, we can see how metaphor shapes
problems and solutions in international relations, as in other areas of our lives. The common
understanding of metaphor is that it is a literary tool, allowing an author to provide
descriptive depth and allegorical commentary by means of establishing a relationship
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38. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1980), 5.
39. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 4. To illustrate that this image is not simply a linguistic
convenience, they suggest imaging a culture in which 'argument' is considered in the terms of 'dance'
rather than 'war': "[W]e would probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing
something different." (5)
40. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 5.
between two separate objects or ideas. Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphor is much
more than this, that it is absolutely fundamental to the way in which people understand and
live in the world around them. "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms
of another."38 [Emphasis in the original] They begin with an example of the way in which the
concept of 'argument' is understood in our society, suggesting that we understand argument
in terms of warfare. To illustrate, they provide examples from our everyday language:
ARGUMENT IS WAR
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I've never won an argument with him
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.39
It is more, however, than simply using the language of war to talk about argument. Rather,
our understanding of what argument is, and the way in which we then set about to argue,
are in part—indeed in large part—structured by the military metaphor:
It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different
kinds of things—verbal discourse and armed conflict—and the actions performed
are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood,
performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically
structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language
is metaphorically structured.40
It would be surprising indeed if we lived our lives, understood our most basic activities and
practices, in terms of metaphor, and then abandoned metaphoric reasoning and
understanding at the level of social and political action. Indeed, if we take Lakoff and
Johnson's arguments seriously, this is not possible, as they are making a case for metaphor
as essential to human cognitive process. This makes impossible the rational choice claim that
there are pre-constituted state interests, or even the organisational claim that there are pre-
constituted, if competing, intra-organisational interests. Rather, the "formulating and
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42. The structure of the arms transfer and production system is analysed by Keith Krause in his Arms
and the State: Patterns of military production and trade, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1992). The term 'arms transfer and
production system' is also Krause's. I have elsewhere considered the variety of political and
economic motivations driving states both to supply and demand weapons and their related
reformulating" of a problem, to which Lebow and Stein refer, involves the formation of the
metaphorical image of a problem, only in terms of which can interests and policies be located.
It is worth examining in more detail how the images and the metaphors they comprise
accomplish this structuring of action. The image, and the metaphors that are contained
within that image, frame a problem in a particular way, so as to highlight certain possibilities,
while precluding others. Lakoff and Johnson argue:
Every description will highlight, downplay, and hide—for example:
I've invited a sexy blonde to our dinner party.
I've invited a renowned cellist to our dinner party.
I've invited a Marxist to our dinner party.
I've invited a lesbian to our dinner party.
Though the same person may fit all of these descriptions, each description
highlights different aspects of the person. Describing someone who you know
has all of these properties as "a sexy blonde" is to downplay the fact that she
is a renowned cellist and a Marxist and to hide her lesbianism.41
The description, given to another guest, forms a key part of the image of his (for the sake
of argument I will assume a heterosexual male) fellow guest. Indeed, not having any other
image on the basis of which to frame behaviour toward this woman, he will base his actions
on the image created by that description. It seems patently obvious that a man will behave
differently to each of the 'people' captured by the four descriptions. The image of the 'sexy
blonde' privileges certain behaviour—behaviour that will be downplayed, if not hidden
outright, by the image of a 'lesbian'. Similarly, our male guest is likely to form very different
conversational strategies to talk with a 'renowned cellist' and with a 'Marxist'.
In a similar way, the characterisation of the problem of 'proliferation' highlights certain
characteristics of the phenomenon, while downplaying and hiding others. That image
contains three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and balance'. As such, the image
highlights the source)spread)recipient nature of the process of arms production and
distribution. At the same time, it downplays the structural nature of the arms production and
transfer system which bind the suppliers and recipients to each other and it hides the fact that
weapons and related technologies are procured for a variety of factors related to external
military threat, internal regime support and economic development.42 I will address these
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43. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 56-60.
44. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 118. Deborah Cameron accuses Lakoff and Johnson of
biologism in her "Naming of Parts: Gender, Culture, and Terms for the Penis among American
College Students", American Speech, 67 (4) 1992, 377-78. Cameron does recognise, however, that Lakoff
becomes more sensitive to this concern in his later work on the subject, George Lakoff, Women, Fire
and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987).
There is, it seems to me, a more trenchant critique of Lakoff and Johnson hiding in
Cameron's charge of biologism. They reject the common form of definition for ignoring the
embedding of concept in metaphor. Hence they suggest "a very different concept of definition
from the standard one. The principal issue for such an account of definition is what gets defined and
what does the defining." (116, emphasis added.) We might, however, wish to ask a third question: who
does the defining. With that addition, the problem of social power in metaphor, which is I think at the
root of Cameron's critique, could be addressed, and would make the conception of metaphor
and definition more palatable to the political scientist. It does not, I think, do any violence to
Lakoff and Johnson's argument to make this amendment. (I take this issue up briefly in the
Conclusion, below.)
features of the problem in more detail below. What is important at this point is to see that
the image and the metaphors it entails privilege a certain set of policy responses—those
which address the 'spread' of technology highlighted by the image—while denying place to
others—policy, for instance, which would seek to address the problems of economic
development which may spur the creation of an arms industry.
Clearly there is a difference between the image of an international problem, which draws in
large part on the understandings of other international problems, and the root metaphors
which are the focus of Lakoff and Johnson. They speak of the 'grounding' of our conceptual
system in terms of simple elements of our everyday lives which we can experience directly,
without social mediation. Thus, for example, spatial metaphors of 'up' and 'down', 'in' and
'out' are based on our experiences of the world—we have an inside and outside, we stand
erect, we sleep lying down and rise when we awake.43 Lakoff and Johnson have been
criticised for a biological bias, and while they clearly want to ground metaphors in part on
our unmediated physiological experience of the world, they also allow for social rather than
biological grounding: "In other words, these "natural" kinds of experience are products of
human nature. Some may be universal, while others will vary from culture to culture."44
Thus, Lakoff and Johnson provide an account of metaphor at the very basic level of
comprehension, but allow for much wider application in providing for cultural as well as
physical experience to serve as a 'grounding' for those metaphors.
The inclusion of social experience does not take us far enough to serve my purposes in this
discussion, however. My concern is with the images and metaphors which structure policy in
the first instance. These obtain in discourses of policy makers, and of the policy community
with which those in government interact—which is why the discussion above focussed
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extensively on the language of that discourse.45 Because the important discourse is that of
a policy community, the relevant images can be 'grounded' in both the metaphors of
everyday experience and in other policy images which are common to the community as a
whole. What is more, the entailments of images and metaphors—the associations which
allow metaphors to relate one kind of thing to another—which are drawn from everyday
experience will grow to include other policy references, in addition to their everyday
entailments. For example, 'balance' is a concept with which we all live, and so the use of
'balance' as a metaphor evokes certain common understandings. However, for those of us
engaged in international relations, balance also entails understandings associated with
'strategic balances' and the 'balance of power'.
For this reason, we can talk of policy images in terms of a 'two-step' image creation process.
The first step is the appropriation of a concept from its everyday meaning for application
to policy. Hence 'proliferation' is appropriated from biology, where it refers to the outward
spread of cells, or of organisms, by means of the reproduction of its parts—in particular,
to the uncontrolled outward spread of cancer cells. Similarly 'stability' and its related concept
'balance' are appropriated from our everyday experience to discuss the relations among
states. Indeed, 'balance' and 'stability' can be seen ultimately to be grounded in the sort of
unmediated biological experiences which interest Lakoff and Johnson. In standing erect,
humans will see a great virtue in 'balance', providing them with 'stability'. 'Instability', leading
to a loss of 'balance' can cause injury or death. From these primary concerns, the metaphors
of stability and balance have entered our common conceptual universe. Sanity is represented
in terms of 'balance' and 'stability' ("She has a balanced mind", "He became unstable"), as
is personality. From these 'root' metaphorical understandings, the concepts of 'balance' and
'stability' are brought into the conceptual universe of students of international relations to
provide metaphors for relations among states. Indeed, these two are among the dominant
metaphors of our discipline.
The second step of the process is the one with which I am most concerned. It is the use of
these metaphors, 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance', as they are embedded in the
understandings of policy makers, to 'reimagine' international security following the end of
the Cold War, and the Gulf War of 1990-91. At this point, the metaphors are applied to the
'security problems' of the third world, not directly from their biological or experiential
referents, but from their embedding in the experience of the Cold War international
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system—although this is not to say that the first step entailments are not also present at the
second step. The reimagination of international security, following the end of the Cold War,
largely involves this second step appropriation of metaphorical concepts.
Finally, to understand my claim that the process detailed above is indeed a 'reimagining',
consider the role of the superpowers in creating in the first place the problem now identified
as proliferation. The huge regional arsenals (now called 'destabilising accumulations') were
in large part the creation of the two superpowers' providing their friends and allies in
different regional conflicts—'proxies' in the language of the Cold War. As we have seen, the
Middle East is the region of primary concern, and yet here the states which are the most
problematic are the ones armed by the US and the USSR ) Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and
Iran.46 It is only with the breakdown of this conceptual system that 'proliferation' was
broadened beyond the narrow field of nuclear weapons to encompass "nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons", and their "missile delivery systems", as well as "destabilizing
accumulations of advanced conventional weapons".
This discussion provides a framework for the examination of the PROLIFERATION
image. The centrality of that image to the contemporary international security agenda is
indicated by President Bill Clinton's first address to the UN General Assembly in the fall of
1993: "I have made non-proliferation one of our nation's highest priorities. We intend to
weave it more deeply into the fabric of all our relationships with the world's nations and
institutions." The PROLIFERATION image is built around three dominant metaphors:
'proliferation', 'stability' and its related concept, 'balance'. The three metaphors were neatly
joined together in a recent article on proliferation from the US Army Journal, Parameters, "The
policy community uses the term 'proliferation' to define a wide array of activities regarding
the spread of weapon technologies. Key to the definition is the notion that proliferation destabilizes
the balance of power within a region."47 I can now examine each of these metaphors to show
what features they highlight, downplay and hide in their information of the
PROLIFERATION image, and how they thereby both privilege and preclude certain policy
solutions.
The Metaphors of PROLIFERATION
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48. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 27-29. The image of MIND IS MACHINE entails such
metaphors as 'the wheels are turning' and 'I'm a little rusty', whereas the image of MIND IS A
BRITTLE OBJECT provides metaphors such as 'her ego is fragile' and 'he cracked under pressure'.
The image of PROLIFERATION as an international security problem is based on a pair
of unrelated metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson stress the coherence of metaphor in the images
of a number of the concepts they use as examples (ARGUMENT IS WAR entails a series
of metaphors growing from the WAR image). However, they also provide examples of
multiple metaphors, with their own entailments, informing a compound image of a
phenomenon—we conceive of the mind both as MACHINE and as BRITTLE OBJECT,
for example.48 PROLIFERATION similarly provides a unique image by joining the
metaphors of 'proliferation' with those of 'stability' and 'balance'.
'Proliferation'
The 'proliferation' metaphor, which is at the root of the image of international security
which is being created and acted on by states at present, comes to this image in the two-step
process I outlined above. The original meanings of proliferation, the 'other' in terms of
which we begin to conceptualise and understand the emergence of nuclear power and
nuclear weapons, is grounded in biology. The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following
primary definitions for the three related words—proliferation, proliferate and proliferous:
"Proliferation ... The formation or development or cells by budding or division."
"Proliferate ... To reproduce by proliferation; to grow by multiplication of elementary
parts."
"Proliferous ... Producing offspring; procreative; prolific."
The first step of the image creation process was the adoption of this biological metaphor
of proliferation for the 'problem' of an increase in the number of states with access to
nuclear technology, once controlled fission was developed in 1945. This first step yielded
'nuclear proliferation' as a policy problem in the Cold War, underpinning the various
solutions that were devised: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its attendant
supplier groups—the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. I have
outlined above the second step of this process, the adoption of the 'proliferation' metaphor
for a wide ranging international security 'problem' in post-Cold War. The new proliferation
agenda, then, draws both on the understandings of the first step, which led to the adoption
of this metaphor to discuss nuclear technology, and the understandings of that initial
application of the metaphor in considering a wider range of technological concerns.
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49. The sentence concludes the authors' introductory paragraph to an overview of the contemporary
study of cell proliferation:
This book is about the cell cycle, the ordered set of processes by which one cell grows and
divides into two daughter cells. Cell growth and division is a cornerstone of biology. Without
understanding how the cell cycle works, we cannot understand how the fusion of two cells, an
egg and a sperm, and the subsequent divisions of the fertilized egg produce an adult human
composed of about 1013 cells. Without knowing the checks and balances that normally ensure
orderly cell division, we cannot devise effective strategies to combat the uncontrolled cell
divisions of the cancers that will kill one in six of us [Andrew Murray and Tim Hunt, The Cell Cycle:
An Introduction, (New York: Freeman, 1993), 1 ].
In case it seems that they are not discussing cell 'proliferation', consider the following:
"Although we know much about some of the steps involved in the regulation of proliferation,
our ignorance about others keeps us from fitting the steps together into a coherent picture of
how cell multiplication is regulated in tissue culture, let alone in intact organisms." (106)
Furthermore, in conversation with the author, a molecular biologist at the University of Guelph
confirmed that 'proliferation' is used as a general term to refer to the growth of cells by division.
The origin of the term "proliferation" is in human and animal reproduction—indicated in
the Oxford definitions by the third, "producing offspring". However, in the discipline of
Biology, the term is now most commonly used to refer to the 'reproduction' of cells, indeed
it is synonymous with "cell division and cell growth". There is a direct, physical link between
cell reproduction and the reproduction of organisms, and so the investigation of the way in
which animals reproduce leads to the consideration of cell "proliferation". To a biologist,
then, "proliferation" refers to the full range of organic reproduction, driven by 'cell
proliferation', including budding yeasts and sexually reproducing humans. There is also a
close connection with excessive multiplication of the elementary parts. Notice that the
definitions from the Oxford conclude with "prolific"—that is proliferation is rarely used to
refer to small scale reproduction. (Even 'normal' cell reproduction in humans, from a single-
cell zygote to an adult, yields on the average 1013 cells!) Indeed, in the brief survey of the 'cell
proliferation' literature I conducted to determine its nature, I found that it is most often
used in connection with cancer research, as cancer involves cells escaping the mechanisms
which control their proliferation.
The connection between 'cell proliferation' and 'cancer' is both important and telling. Cell
proliferation is a harmless, natural process—indeed, it is absolutely essential to life as we
know it. This proliferation is managed by a series of biological control mechanisms, which
serve to regulate the proliferation of cells so that they faithfully reproduce what is coded
into their genetic material. Once these mechanisms fail, and the cells proliferate without
control, cancers, often deadly to the organism as a whole, result. As Andrew Murray and
Tim Hunt write, in introducing the study of cell proliferation: "Without knowing the checks
and balances that normally ensure orderly cell division, we cannot devise effective strategies
to combat the uncontrolled cell divisions of the cancers that will kill one in six of us."49
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'Proliferation' in its base biological meaning then, refers to an autonomous process of
growth and outward spread, internally driven but externally controlled. Danger arises when
the controls fail and the natural proliferation of cells produces excessive reproduction.
The first step of the adoption of 'proliferation' as a metaphor for international security
involved applying the term to the development of nuclear technology after the discovery of
controlled fission in the United States' Manhattan Project. The United States' nuclear
programme represented the source 'cell' or 'organism' from which the technology would
spread. Such spread was a 'natural' process, and so scholars confidently predicted that there
would be thirty or forty nuclear powers by 1980. Such a condition was considered
dangerous, and undesirable, and so attempts were made to establish external controls on the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. These attempts resulted in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
of 1970, which remains the principal mechanism of proliferation control. The development
of nuclear technology was thus imagined in terms of the 'proliferation' metaphor. The first
question to be asked is what are the implications of this image, with its understandings of
autonomy, spread and external control, for the policy response to the development of
nuclear technology? There are two crucial entailments of the proliferation metaphor as
applied to nuclear weapons.
The first entailment is the image of a spread outward from a point, or source. Cell division
begins with a single, or source cell, and spreads outward from there — in the case of a
cancer, both to produce a single tumour and to create a number of separate tumours
throughout the host body. Similarly, the 'problem' of proliferation is one of a source or
sources 'proliferating', that is reproducing itself by supplying the necessary technology to a
new site of technological application. This image highlights the transmission process from
source to recipient, and entails policy designed to cut off the supply, restricting the
technology to its source. Hence, the dominant response to nuclear proliferation is the
creation of supplier groups, the Zangger Committee and the NSG, which seeks to 'control'
the spread of nuclear technology. In other words, they attempt to provide "the checks and
balances that normally ensure orderly" transfer, and prevent the spread of nuclear
technology resulting in the "cancer" of weapons' proliferation. The image is repeated even
in the more extreme proposals for policy. For example, former Prime Minster Trudeau
proposed a scheme to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament for preventing
weapons' spread. This scheme included two measures currently under consideration at the
Conference on Disarmament, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a Cutoff of Fissile
Material Production. Trudeau's plan was known as the 'suffocation proposal'—firmly in
keeping with the biological referent of proliferation. To stop, rather than control,
reproduction by organisms, you need to 'suffocate' the progenitors.
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The second entailment of the 'proliferation' metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons
spread is an extreme technological bias. Biological proliferation is an internally driven
phenomenon, and so the image of 'Proliferation' applied to the development of nuclear
technology highlights the autonomous spread of that technology, and its problematic
weapons variant. As Frank Barnaby writes in a recent work, "A country with a nuclear
power programme will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and will
accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons."50 In fact, the text
from which this is drawn presents an interesting example of the autonomy of the
'proliferation' metaphor. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-weapon proliferation in
the 1990s. Notice that the weapons themselves spread, they are not spread by an external agent of
some form—say a human being or human institution. Under most circumstances such a title
would be unnoticed, for as Lakoff and Johnson argue, the metaphors are so deeply
engrained in our conceptual system that they are not recognised as being metaphorical.
This image, by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of a process of spread,
downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to
international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not
spread, but are spread—and in fact are spread largely by the western states. Secondly, the
image downplays, to the point of hiding, any of the political, social, economic and structural
factors which tend to drive states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear
weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat, naturalising the
'security dilemma' to the point that it is considered as an automatic dynamic. The image of
PROLIFERATION thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy, by casting the problem as
a technical, apolitical one. The Non-Proliferation Treaty controls and safeguards the
movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly
impose controls on the supply—that is the outward flow—of this same technology. The
goal, in both cases, is to stem or, at least slow, the outward movement of material and its
attendant techniques.
Such a policy is almost doomed to fail, however, for it downplays and hides the very
concerns which motivate the agents of the process. Iraq was driven to acquire nuclear
weapons, even in the face of NPT commitments, and so employed technology which is
considered so outdated that it is no longer tightly controlled. This simply does not fit with
the NPT-NSG-Zangger Committee approach. In addition, in order to gain the necessary
material, the Iraqis needed access to external technology. Such technology was acquired by
human agents acting for the Iraqi state and was acquired from other agents, who had their
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own motivational interests to provide the necessary technology. The technology does not
'spread' through some autonomous process akin to that causing a zygote to become a
person, but rather they are spread, and so the agents involved are able to sidestep the
technologically focussed control efforts.
The second step of this process, reimagining international security in the terms of
PROLIFERATION following the end of the Cold War, adopts the policy entailments along
with the underlying biological imagery. By using the PROLIFERATION image now to
address biological and chemical weapons, missile technology and even conventional
weapons, the international community is replicating the problematic policy solutions which
highlight technology and hide politics and agency. Thus the NPT and its supplier groups are
joined by the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group, a supplier group
which also oversees export controls on both chemical and biological weapons' technology.
Missile technology is controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even
conventional arms, the ones we might expect to be most closely related to understandings
of politics, are conceived in terms of 'excessive and destabilising accumulations'. Once more,
it is the weapons themselves, rather than the political agents acquiring and using them,
which are the lexical focus of discussions of conventional arms. What is ignored by this
policy approach is any suggestion that there are political interests or motivations at work,
which may cause human institutions to act in ways which promote insecurity (which, in
other words, destabilize). A good part of the reason for this lack of understanding is that the
image of the problem is one which downplays, and even hides, the involvement of the
politics of human agency in both the acts of supply and acquisition.
'Stability' and 'Balance'
The two related terms 'stability' and 'balance' are so firmly seated in the language of
international relations that their metaphorical nature is seldom remembered—as with many
of the metaphors Lakoff and Johnson discuss. Thus the use of the two in imagining the new
international security agenda around PROLIFERATION tends to draw more explicitly on
the entailments that have been generated by that disciplinary use. It is, nevertheless, still
useful to remember the first step of the two step process of metaphor creation—the
understanding of international relations in terms of our common experiences of 'balance'
and 'stability'.
While the metaphor of 'proliferation' is grounded in processes which are most basic to
human life, the metaphors of 'stability' and 'balance' are probably more firmly rooted in
most people's common experiences. Both terms are used widely in the metaphors of our
everyday lives, and wherever they occur, value is placed on maintaining stability and balance.
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Thus we speak of people being 'well balanced', or of having 'stable personalities'. Teams are
most successful if they have a 'balanced' attack, and people look for 'stable' employment and
to 'balance' their bank accounts. Given the positive connotations of 'stability' and 'balance',
it should not be surprising that their use as metaphors of international relations connote a
normative commitment to the creation and maintenance of stable and balanced orders.
The balance of power is generally used to refer to the system of interstate relations created
in Europe following the defeat of Napoleon.51 The mechanism of power
balancing—stabilising relations among states by maintaining power equivalences—was
progressively naturalised by theorists of international relations. Hedley Bull argues that both
an objective and subjective balance are necessary for a balance of power to operate.
Nevertheless, he clearly places primacy on the objective conditions of the balance: "But if
the subjective element of belief in it is necessary for the existence of a balance of power, it
is not sufficient.... A balance of power that rests not on the actual will and capacity of one
state to withstand the assaults of another, but merely on bluff and appearances, is likely to
be fragile and impermanent."52 This naturalisation of the balance of power reached its zenith
with Kenneth Waltz' Theory of International Politics:
The theory, then, is built up from the assumed motivations of states and the actions
that correspond to them. It describes the constraints that arise from the system that
those actions produce, and it indicates the expected outcome: namely, the formation
of balances of power. Balance-of-power theory is microtheory precisely in the
economist's sense. The system, like a market in economics, is made by the actions
and interactions of its units, and the theory is based on assumptions about their
behavior.53
Thus the balance of power is not only a desired outcome—in keeping with the normative
commitment of people to balance and stability, power balancing is the natural outcome of
the behaviour of states. There is thus strong incentive to maintain 'balances' and to avoid
anything which could 'destabilise' them. Throughout the Cold War, the military relationship
between the superpowers in particular was therefore examined in minute detail to avoid
'instabilities'—either 'arms race instabilities' or 'crisis instabilities'.
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The dualism inherent in the concept of equipoise can be seen by tracing through its meanings. The
Oxford English Dictionary defined equipoise with reference to 'counter-balance', which it further defines
as "a weight or influence which balances another." [Emphasis added.]
The first step adoption of metaphors of 'stability' and 'balance' to think international
relations produced the imagination of the Cold War in terms of a balance of power, and of
the need to maintain that balance by avoiding instabilities. The second step use of these
metaphors has involved their adoption from the Cold War security image to apply to the
new image of PROLIFERATION. As I demonstrated above, a key element of this image
is a definition of the problem posed by proliferation in terms of its effects on the 'stability'
of (regional) balances of power. This step involves a number of entailments, derived both
from the metaphors' grounding and from the specific meanings of the Cold War.
The first entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors is that they highlight dyadic
relationships. Our common experience with 'balancing' is that of two masses offsetting one
another—rendered visually by the classic scale, or "balance". Two masses—or in the case
of international relations, two states—offset each other in a 'stable' fashion. The
introduction of a third mass greatly complicates the problem of balancing.54 While the classic
balance of power system in Europe is generally considered to have five states (Russia,
Prussia, Austro-Hungary, France and Britain), the actual mechanism of the balance was the
creation and maintenance of stably balancing dyads. Britain's famed role as a 'balancer'
involved it changing sides so as to ensure that one grouping did not overbalance the other.
Hedley Bull indicates the dyadic basis of the balance of power in the following discussion
of simple (dyadic) and complex (three or more) balances:
Whereas a simple balance of power necessarily requires equality or parity in
power, a complex balance of power does not. In a situation of three or more
competing powers the development of gross inequalities in power among them does
not necessarily put the strongest in a position of preponderance, because the others have the
possibility of combining against it [Emphasis added.]55
Martin Wight also argued that regardless of the form of system of balance, the concept was
infused with a dyadic understanding of balance: "But the distinction between multiple and
simple balance is immaterial to the conception of the balance of power as an even
distribution. In both the multiple and the simple balance there is the idea of equipoise."56
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Indeed, Waltz took this feature of metaphor and history and raised it to the status of law,
arguing that the ideal—that is most stable—balance is that between two roughly equivalent
states: "International politics is necessarily a small-number system. The advantages of having
a few more great powers is at best slight. We have found instead that the advantages of
subtracting a few and arriving at two are decisive."57
During the Cold War, the dyadic understandings of 'balance' were reasonably appropriate
to the superpower confrontation, as there were two roughly equivalent superpowers
anchoring two roughly equivalent alliances. Even then, however, the image downplays and
hides those outside the central 'balance', rendering non-European states or regions either
as invisible or as mere appendages to the superpower confrontation. To imagine third
parties as autonomous would be to introduce problematic third and higher order 'masses'
into the metaphorical 'balance'. However, the regional security systems which are today of
greatest PROLIFERATION concern to those, mainly in the North and West, who use the
image, simply do not resolve themselves into dyads. They are neither dominated by the
confrontation of two overpowering opponents, nor do they divide into two allied groupings.
Nevertheless, the metaphor of balance leads to the characterisation of these regions in
dyadic terms.
In the Middle East, the region in which the present image could be said to have been born,
the relationships among the various states are complex, and yet even accounting for these
varied relations misses the sub- and trans-national dimensions of the politics of Middle
Eastern security. For instance, the place of the Kurds in Iraq, and their relations to the
Kurds in both Iran and Turkey, is an important element of the 'security' relationship in the
eastern Middle East—and centrally involved in both Gulf Wars of the past fifteen years.58
Similarly, the Israeli relationship with the Palestinians involves complex relations among
Palestinians living in Israel, Jews living in Palestine, Palestinians in neighbouring countries,
and those countries' states. Despite this complexity, the power of the dyadic entailment
shapes discussions of the region. The most prevalent dyadic construction, of course, is that
which characterises the region's complexities as "the Arab-Israeli conflict". Yet the two most
recent wars in the region involved an Arab state's army fighting one of another Muslim
(though not Arab) state, and a broad coalition destroying an Arab state—a coalition that
included both Arabs and, to all intents and purposes, Israel.
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The same problems arise in other regions of concern. South Asia is, at its most simple, an
intricate dance among India, Pakistan and the PRC—a construction which ignores the
Kashmiris, Tamils and Sri Lanka. Despite the centrality of the triad of powers, there is a
strong tendency to speak of the region in terms of the dyadic Indo-Pakistani relationship.
Indeed, this tendency can be seen in part to have resulted in the growth of India's arsenal:
The Indian military buildup may also be explained by the various decision-maker's
political image of the state in international society. One of the problems with Indian
leaders and policy-makers since the death of Prime Minister Jawaharal Nehru in
1964, is the feeling that India does not get enough respect, especially compared to
China, with which it sees itself as essentially equal in size, population and economic
development. Instead, India is constantly equated with Pakistan, a nation at one time
one-fifth its size in population and capabilities, and only one-eighth its size since the
creation of Bangladesh in December 1971.59
Similarly, in the North Pacific, while the relationship between North and South Korea is of
central importance, the security dynamic cannot be understood outside the context of the
relations among these two states and the PRC, Japan and the United States, at the very least.
These five do not break into two neat groupings, and yet the dyadic, "North against South",
representation of the problem is common.
A second important entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors is that they highlight
numerical capabilities, while downplaying qualitative capabilities, and hiding other aspects
of security—even aspects of the military other than equipment. This entailment is rooted
both in the experiential basis of the metaphors and in their use during the Cold War.
'Balance' is by and large a quantitative, not qualitative characteristic—on a scale, a kilo of
feathers will balance a kilo of lead. In particular, the accounting of numbers of various kinds,
though notably money, involves the metaphor of 'balance'. Thus it should not be surprising
that the application of the balance metaphor to the relationships of arms leads to a focus
on numerical capabilities. The experience of superpower arms negotiation was in large
measure guided by attempts to achieve 'essential equivalences'—in the number of launchers,
the number of warheads, the throw weight of missiles, or the number of tanks.
What gets downplayed by the numerical entailment of these metaphors is the variation in
capability among different weapons and weapon systems. This can be seen in the present
proliferation control systems. The MTCR identifies technologies of concern by range and
payload, entirely ignoring the reliability of the weapons, and even their accuracy (which is
generally well measured)—in other words, ignoring most of what determines whether a
weapon will be delivered on target by a given missile. Similarly, the UN Arms Register
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records weapons in seven categories, so that, for example, all 'tanks' are counted together.
Thus, in the first reporting cycle, the United Kingdom included several pieces of obsolete
equipment that were transferred for display in museums. The comments that allow the
Register's users to realise that these entries are museum pieces were purely voluntary. For
example, Britain reported two exports of tanks. Six tanks were sent to Switzerland, and were
marked "Obsolete equipment for museums", while 25 were reported sent to Nigeria.
Nothing more than that 25 tanks were sent was reported by the UK, and so the character
of these weapons is still formally opaque.60
While it is unfortunate that the numerical entailment of the balance metaphor downplays
the quality of arms, it is much more problematic that it hides entirely aspects of the security
problem other than arms—be this military doctrine and policy, or the more general politics
of security.61 Indeed, the entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' in this context tend to
reinforce the autonomous, technological character of the problem which is entailed by the
'proliferation' metaphor. Technology 'spreads' through some natural process. We can count
the occurrence of this spread, so that we know where the technology is accumulating. We
may even be able to control this autonomous process. However, it is these accumulations,
if we do not prevent them, which can then 'upset' balances; in the words of Resolution
46/36L: "excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and
international security."
There is a third, and rather ironic, entailment to the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors—they
can lead to the promotion of the spread of nuclear weapons to a greater number of states. The
logic of the 'balance' between the superpowers, it has been argued, is that mutual assured
destruction with nuclear weapons introduces a caution conducive to 'stability'. If the
metaphors of the Cold War are adopted to imagine the new international security
environment, there seems little way to escape the conclusions of this argument, that nuclear
weapons can be stabilisers. Indeed, it has led John Mearsheimer to argue:
If complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe proves unavoidable, the West
faces the question of how to maintain peace in a multipolar Europe. Three policy
prescriptions are in order.
First, the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons
in Europe. The best hope for avoiding war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear
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deterrence; hence some nuclear proliferation is necessary to compensate for the
withdrawal of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals from Central Europe.
[Emphasis added.]62
As part of the 'managed proliferation' of nuclear weapons in Europe, Mearsheimer suggests
provision of nuclear arms to Germany. On this and on other points Mearsheimer's
argument has been widely, and justifiably, attacked. But what is interesting about it is the
way in which it makes the entailments of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors so clear.
What is important is to assure that the numbers of weapons are distributed so that the balance
among them is stable — regardless of who holds the weapons. The problems of history and
politics which would be raised by German nuclear weapons are blithely ignored, because the
metaphors informing Mearsheimer's conceptualisation hide them entirely. Most of us are
sufficiently sensitive to these problems that Mearsheimer's argument is jarringly
uncomfortable. However, the problem persists in all uses of the PROLIFERATION image,
and yet it is only when the problems are as dramatic as in this case that the implications of
the image are widely rejected.
In the title of his article, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War",
Mearsheimer also indicates the final entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance'
metaphors—they are inherently conservative. It is not an accident that it was a conservative
alliance facing a revolutionary challenge that formulated the practice we now call the balance
of power. Nor is it an accident that the changes in Eastern Europe, while welcomed in the
West on democratic grounds, were feared for their capability to introduce 'instability'.63
When a 'balance' is 'stable', an asymmetrical alteration to either side introduces instability.
Thus once a stable balance is achieved, the metaphor highlights the importance of the
maintenance of the status quo.
The conservative bias of the metaphors is problematic, even within the limited confines of
a proliferation problem. The goal of policy makers seems clearly to be the reduction of
weapons and their related technologies—at least in the arsenals of others! The image,
however, which is informing the policy response to the problem, provides no support for
reduction once a stable balance is achieved. There can be no guarantee that any reduction
in arsenals, even a 'symmetrical' reduction, would produce a similarly stable balance at the
lower levels of arms. Indeed, building on the received wisdom of the Cold War, there might
even be a case to be made for high levels of arms, as a 'balance' at high levels is more
resistant to small changes—that is, it is more 'stable'.
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There is, of course, a more politically problematic result of the conservative entailment of
'stability' and 'balance'. The emphasis on 'stability' hides the struggles of the oppressed, and
the security concerns of any other than the regime controlling the state. Change introduces
the possibility of upsetting a balance, and as stability is so highly valued, change of any kind
is to be opposed. It is for this reason that we should not be surprised that The Balance of
Power was devised by the defenders of the monarchical order in face of the Napoleonic
challenge. The conservative nature of the stress on stability can be seen in the reaction of
the West in general, and the United States in particular, to the changes in Eastern Europe.
Consider the example of the ill-received speech US President Bush gave in the Ukraine, in
August 1991, as reported by the Loas Angeles Times:
"Freedom is not the same as independence," Bush told Zayets and the rest
of Ukraine's legislature on Aug. 1. "Americans will not support those who seek
independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will
not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred."
Shorn of rhetorical niceties, the American position seemed to be: Moscow
and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev know best. Although the legislature here
was dominated by Communists still opposed at that time to secession, Bush's speech
"went down about as well as cod-liver oil," one Kiev-based diplomat remarked.64
Bush's so-called 'Chicken Kiev' speech reflected the bias towards the known, towards the
status quo. This bias was further revealed in the policy the US was simultaneously pursuing
towards changes in Yugoslavia. A US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State justified the
continuing US policy of supporting the Yugoslav union, in terms which draw the links
between this conservative thinking and the emphasis on stability:
Many have asked why we chose to include unity among the goals we supported in
Yugoslavia. From the beginning, our fundamental policy objective in Yugoslavia has
been democracy, not unity. But when the Yugoslav crisis began, we decided to state
our support for both unity and democracy because we believed that unity offered the
best prospects for democracy and stability throughout Yugoslavia. Given
Yugoslavia's crazy-quilt ethnic makeup and history of deep-seated ethnic disputes,
we believed that the only alternative to some form of democratic unity was violence,
suffering, and long-term instability.65
As both the USSR and the Yugoslavian federations fell apart, the US position was to fight
to maintain the status quo, in the interests of 'stability'.
This conclusion, that security in the present international system is politically conservative,
is not a new one. Indeed, the chapters of this volume are, in many ways, predicated on the
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recognition of the problems posed by the narrow and conservative nature of international
security as it commonly understood. What I have hoped to show is that this bias is an
entailment of the metaphorical images we use to construct the problems in the first place.
As such it serves to naturalise a particular set of relations of power and interest, privileging
those who are able to set the metaphorical agenda, and to render invisible the political basis
of their claims.
The Assembled Image
The image of PROLIFERATION knits together the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability'
and 'balance' to shape the policy responses of the international community. The metaphors
have certain entailments, which serve to highlight, downplay and hide aspects of the security
environment. Thus, the policy responses which are being developed address primarily those
aspects highlighted, while ignoring those downplayed and hidden. The image is of an
autonomously driven process of spread, outward from a particular source or sources. It is
an apolitical image, which strongly highlights technology, capability and gross accounts of
number. As such, it is an image that masks the political interests of those supporting the
present structure of proliferation control—a structure which strongly reflects this image and
its entailments.
To begin with, the control efforts are classified by the technology of concern. Thus there are
global instruments for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, of chemical and biological
weapons, and a register of conventional arms. There is no global instrument for the control
of the spread of missile technology, but the MTCR addresses this technology as a discrete
problem, and is considering evolving into a global regime. There is thus little or no
recognition in the practical response to PROLIFERATION that the spread of these
technologies might all be part of a common 'security' problem. The security concerns which
might drive states to acquire one or more of these technologies are hidden by the
PROLIFERATION image. This division of the problem into discrete technologies persists,
despite the fact that the connection among the various technologies of concern manifests
itself in a number of ways. I will mention only two by way of illustration. The first is the
common reference to biological weapons as "the poor man's atomic bomb". The
implication of this phrase is that a state prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons—in this
case for reasons of cost—could turn to biological weapons to serve the same purposes. The
second example is of the links being drawn in the Middle East between Arab states'
potential chemical arms, and Israel's nuclear arsenal. The Arab states are balking at ratifying
the CWC until the Israeli nuclear arms are at least placed on the negotiating table.
Conversely, supporters of the Israeli position can cite the Arab states' overwhelming
conventional superiority as a justification for Israel's nuclear arms.
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The common approach to 'controlling' proliferation across the technologies of concern is
the limitation and even denial of the supply of technology. Each of the technologies of
concern is addressed by at least one suppliers group, and the major Western suppliers
maintain export controls to implement the groups' lists. Such an approach is clearly
informed by the entailments of the PROLIFERATION image. Supplier controls respond
to the 'spread outward from a source' entailment of 'proliferation'. They also reflect the ways
in which both the metaphors of 'proliferation' and 'stability' highlight technology, by
focussing solely on its nature and movement. In addition, these groups reflect the various
entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' outlined above. They seek to prevent "excessive and
destabilizing accumulations" of technologies through the application of their controls. Lost
entirely in these practices are considerations of the political and economic underpinnings
of security. These aspects are hidden by the image, and so are not addressed by the policy
responses.
The relationship between these political interests, the policy responses and the metaphors
of the PROLIFERATION image would form the subject of another paper, at the very least.
However, it is not responsible to ignore entirely this relationship, and so I will provide an
example by way of illustration. India stands as a leading opponent of the present approach
to proliferation control, with its roots in technological denial. India represents a different
set of interests from those of the northern states most concerned with PROLIFERATION
as presently understood and practiced. For India, access to technology is vital, and the
principle of discrimination between the have and have not states—enshrined most notably
in the NPT, but seen throughout the non-proliferation measures for denying technologies'
spread—is absolutely unacceptable. As such, the Indians reject the image of
PROLIFERATION, and call rather for DISARMAMENT. This view is reflected in the
following passage, quoted from a paper by the Indian Ambassador to Japan, who was
previously the Indian representative on the Conference on Disarmament:
It would be futile to pretend that 1995 is 1970, that nothing has changed and nothing
requires to be changed in the 1995 NPT. It would be a cruel joke on the coming
generation to say that they will be safer with an indefinite extension of the 1970
NPT. 1995 presents an opportunity; there is great scope for non governmental
agencies, intellectuals and academics, who believe in nuclear disarmament to work
towards changing this mindset and spur governments in nuclear weapon countries
to look at reality, to accept that there are shortcomings in the NPT and that nations,
both within and outside the NPT have genuine concerns which need to be addressed
in order to make the NPT universal, non discriminatory and a true instrument for nuclear
disarmament. [Emphasis added.]66
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There are three noteworthy elements of this plea for change. The first is that Ambassador
Shah recognises the importance of changing the mindset toward the problem in order to
effect change in the policy responses to that problem. This feature of his remarks relates to
the second. Ambassador Shah casts his justification for alterations in the NPT as reflecting
a changed reality—thereby attacking the naturalisation of the features of the world which
are highlighted by the PROLIFERATION image, as reflected in the NPT. Finally,
Ambassador Shah calls for the new NPT to be an instrument of 'nuclear disarmament', not
non-proliferation. In other words, he recognises that there is a policy problem to be
addressed, but it is not a PROLIFERATION problem—that is, a spread of weapons
technology from those who have to those who do not presently have. Rather, the problem
needs to be imagined as a (DIS)ARMAMENT problem—the possession of nuclear and
other arms, regardless of who has them.
For the countries of the north, the indefinite extension of an unamended NPT is considered
essential. The NPT is seen as the linchpin of the proliferation control effort, without which
the entire edifice might fall. What Ambassador Shah's comments demonstrate, reflecting the
position taken in India, is the way in which that effort, tied so closely to the entailments of
the PROLIFERATION image, serves only a particular set of interests by highlighting only
specific features of 'reality'. From where he sits, 'reality' provides Ambassador Shah with a
different approach to the problem of nuclear (and other mass destruction) weapons, an
approach better captured through an image of (DIS)ARMAMENT than one of
PROLIFERATION.
Conclusions
The discussion in this paper has examined the way in which international security, and
international security policy, are constituted in the terms of an assembly of metaphors. An
image, comprising a series of metaphors, provides the conceptual frame for a problem, and
therefore structures the policy agenda by privileging a particular set of solutions which can
be proposed and implemented. In particular, the image highlights certain aspects of a given
problem, while downplaying others and hiding still more. The policy solutions which will
be advanced will, not surprisingly, focus upon the features highlighted by the image, and
ignore those downplayed and hidden. I have shown how in the aftermath of the Cold War,
and in the context of the Gulf War, an image of a problem of PROLIFERATION was
developed, which comprised three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance'. The
entailments of these metaphors provide an image of an autonomous, technical, apolitical
process, which if left unchecked spreads its technological offspring outwards from its
source, resulting in excessive and destabilising accumulations elsewhere. This image is
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reflected in, and is driving the further development of, the instruments of control—the
policy being applied to the problem defined by PROLIFERATION.
There are two classes of conclusion I can draw from this discussion, those relating to policy
and those to theory. I would suggest two conclusions concerning the present policies of
proliferation control. The first is that the image of PROLIFERATION is giving rise to a
policy agenda dominated by strategies of technology denial. Such strategies reflect the
technological bias and the 'outward from a source' entailments of proliferation. However,
they are profoundly problematic in the contemporary international system. Technology
denial is serving to deepen the already wide gap between North and South. It ignores
entirely the needs of economic development—needs which are at least as great a security
concern as is the spreading of weapons technology. In addition, the strategy is unsustainable.
Because the PROLIFERATION image is of an autonomous process, it takes no account
of the political and economic interests driving the supply of military technology. These
interests are presently being felt in the United States, for example, in opposition to any
extension of export controls—despite the United States long being the leader of the supplier
control groups.67 The second policy conclusion is related to the first. The metaphors of
'stability' and 'balance' are similarly ill-suited to the contemporary security environment.
Even if we accept that they provided useful conceptual frames to understand the
superpower relationship in the Cold War, they are not appropriate to the regional security
arenas of the post-Cold War. The entailments of 'stability' in particular can not account for
the variety and complexity of the Middle East, South Asia or the North Pacific, to mention
the regions of contemporary concern. Regional security, and security policy, must then be
'reimagined' on bases other than those provided by 'stability' and 'balance', and hence by
PROLIFERATION.
On a more conceptual note, the implications of this argument are that in order better to
understand and influence international security and security policy, we must identify the
images that are supporting and informing that policy, and the metaphors of which they are
composed. These will provide the scale along which policy responses are ordered,
privileging some while rejecting others. Furthermore, to understand fully the nature of an
image and its attendant metaphors, it is necessary to discover their origin. The metaphors
which concerned Paul Chilton, for example, were drawn from everyday experience—quite
deliberately, as their function was to bolster extant policy in the public mind. However, the
images and metaphors which concerned me here structure the thought of policy-makers
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themselves. Therefore, while the images may be drawn from a different universe, the
intellectual function they serve is the same.
The analysis of metaphor provided here is by no means complete. I have examined the
relationship between the metaphorical images of security problems and the policy responses.
To draw this form of work more fully into a research agenda of 'critical security studies', it
would be necessary to develop the relationship of these two to political interests. How does
power affect the formation of metaphorical images? Whose interests are promoted by
particular images, and whose are ignored? These questions need also be asked in reverse: do
particular images operate so as to enhance the power of particular actors or groups, and also
to create and reproduce sets of interest? Clearly these questions are well beyond the scope
of this chapter, but need to be considered in the building of a new research agenda for
international security.
These conclusions hold two implications for 'critical' security studies. First of all, the
exploration of the metaphors underlying policy will form an important part of a general
project of critique, understood as revealing the power relations hidden by security relations.
Those power relations are masked by the metaphorical understandings of the images of
security, and so to reveal them, the images must themselves be revealed. Secondly, the
impulse to critique is rooted in a political stance opposed to the dominant powers, and thus
supporting the struggles of the oppressed. In order to create alternative security policies
from the perspective of the oppressed, the present argument suggests the need first to
construct images of security problems which privilege their interests, rather than those of
the dominant powers—(DIS)ARMAMENT rather than PROLIFERATION, for example.
Finally, it is important that I be clear about the one conclusion I am not drawing. I am by no
means suggesting that such imagining and metaphoric reasoning is by itself dangerous.
Rather, it is both essential and impossible to eliminate. What must be recognised is that
images and their metaphors privilege certain policy solutions. Therefore the choice of image
must be guided by the appropriateness of the privileged solutions to the problem at hand,
but more importantly by the normative convictions of the chooser.
